This study investigates the morning commute problem with both household and individual travels, where the household travel is a shared ride of household (family) members. In particular, it considers the situation when a proportion of commuters have to drive their children to school first and then go to work (household travel). For household travel, departure time choice is a joint decision based on all household membersÕ preferences. Unlike the standard bottleneck model, the rush-hour dynamic traffic pattern with mixed travelers (household travelers and individual travelers) varies with the numbers of individual travelers and households, as well as the schedule difference between school and work. Given the numbers of individual travelers and households, we show that by appropriately coordinating the schedules of work and school, the traffic congestion at the highway bottleneck can be relieved, and hence the total travel cost can be reduced. This is because, departure/arrival of individual and household travels can be separated by schedule coordination. System performance under schedule coordination is quantified in terms of the relative proportions of the two classes of travelers and is compared with the extreme case when the same desired arrival time applies to both schooling and working. Furthermore, the efficiency of work and school schedule coordination in reducing travel cost is bounded. This efficiency is also compared with that at the system optimum where queuing is fully eliminated and schedule delay cost is minimized (achieved by a joint scheme of first-best pricing and schedule coordination).
1.! Introduction
Traffic congestion is pervasive in many metropolitan areas and is worsening throughout many countries. In the literature, understanding the dynamic traffic pattern and managing traffic congestion in the morning peak hour have been studied extensively by both transportation scientists and economists. Vickrey (1969) was the first to propose the bottleneck model to capture the traffic dynamics in the rush hour. In VickreyÕs model, the congestion is modeled as a deterministic queue behind a bottleneck of fixed capacity. Travelers choose their departure times to minimize individual travel cost including travel delay cost and schedule delay cost. Based on this model, various issues have been studied, e.g., existence and uniqueness of user equilibrium solution at a single bottleneck (Smith, 1984; Daganzo, 1985; Lindsey, 2004) ; road pricing, tradable credits, and tradable permits to manage traffic congestion (Arnott et al., 1990; Laih, 1994; Xiao et al., 2012; Tian et al., 2013; Nie and Yin, 2013; Wada and Akamatsu, 2013) ; stochastic bottleneck capacity and travel demand (Arnott et al., 1999; Lindsey, 2009; Xiao et al., 2015) ; morning commute with heterogeneous travelers (Arnott et al., 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Liu and Nie, 2011; Liu et al., 2014b; Liu et al., 2015a; Liu et al., 2015c) ; integrated problem of parking and morning commute (Arnott et al., 1991; Zhang et al., 2008; Qian et al., 2011; Qian et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014a; Xiao et al., 2016) ; capacity drop and/or hypercongestion (Arnott, 2013; Liu et al., 2015b; Liu and Geroliminis, 2016) ; complementarity formulation or ordinary differential equation formulation (Ramadurai et al., 2010; Wu and Huang, 2015; Wang and Xu, 2016) .
However, most of the previous studies focus on analyzing and managing the commuting problem with individual travelers only. Little attention has been paid to household travels. Different from individual trips, a household trip consists of the travels of all household members, i.e., shared ride of household members. Note that ride sharing is encouraged as the same number of travelers can be transported with less vehicles and drivers, and traffic congestion and environmental pollution can be reduced. Recently, de Palma et al. (2015) considered that individuals live as couples and value time at home more when together than when alone. They estimated the trip-time preference for married and unmarried men and women in the Greater Paris region. More recently, Jia et al. (2016) considered the equilibrium trip scheduling for households where each household travel group consists of one adult traveler and one child, and the adult traveler has to send the child to school first and then go to the workplace. For household travel, more than one member in the household will be involved in the departure time choice decision, i.e., all the membersÕ preference of arrival times have to be considered (e.g., for work and for school).
In Jia et al. (2016) , all travelers are assumed to be household travelers. This is reasonable as a first step to understand how household travel is different from individual travel in departure time choices. However, this is usually not the case in reality as there will be both household travelers and individual travelers. Therefore, not only the interactions among members within a household can affect departure time decisions and the traffic equilibrium, but also the interactions among household travelers and individual travelers (through sharing the same road network) can re-shape the dynamic traffic pattern in the morning peak. This study, by considering this more realistic case with mixed travelers, will help us to better understand the impact of household travels. Indeed, the model presented in this paper incorporates that in Jia et al. (2016) as a special or extreme case, where the number of individual travelers equals zero (this has been specified in Section 3).
Specifically, we consider that there are two types of travels: individual travel and household travel. An individual travel consists of only one trip, i.e., going to the workplace (given that travelers have a desired arrival time for work). A typical household travel consists of two successive trips, i.e., dropping off the children at the school and then going to the workplace. In this case, there are two desired arrival times: desired arrival time at school and desired arrival time at work. For individual travel, travelers have no cost associated with the school, while the household travel will take into account the costs associated with both school and work. We firstly explore the dynamic equilibrium traffic pattern with both household and individual travels. Then we examine how to coordinate school schedule and work schedule in order to reduce the traffic congestion, and thus reduce the total travel cost. Also, we analyze the efficiency of schedule coordination (for work and school).
It is worth mentioning that the efficiency of schedule coordination depends on relative proportions of the two classes of travelers, and can be bounded. Note that there is a branch of studies looking into staggered work hours (e.g., Henderson 1981; Yushimito et al., 2014; Shirmohammadi et al., 2015; Takayama, 2015) . However, all of these studies focus on the coordination of work schedules for individuals. None of them involves household trips or school schedule. Besides, we found that total travel cost can decrease with the proportion of household travelers in the population (which can be counterintuitive as a larger number of households suggest a larger number of travelers in total). We also found that schedule delay cost does not always increase with the difference between the two desired arrival times (for work and school).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents problem description and the cost formulations for both households and individual travelers. The dynamic traffic pattern at departure/arrival equilibrium with mixed travelers is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the system performance under given numbers of different travelers and work and school schedules, and then evaluates and bounds the efficiency of coordinating work and school schedules in reducing total travel cost. Numerical illustration and verification are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.! Problem Formulation
Consider a bottleneck-constrained highway connecting a residential area and a city center (workplace) as shown in Figure 1 . There is a school between home and workplace after the highway bottleneck. In the morning commute, there are two types of travelers: individual travelers and household travelers, which are described in the following. t . For these individual travelers, they will make a trade-off between the travel time cost related to queue length at the highway bottleneck and the schedule delay cost of arriving early or late at work.
Besides the 1 N individual travelers, there are travelers from 2 N households. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is one adult and one child per household (all of them are referred to as household travelers in this paper). While later in the paper we sometimes might use 2 N to refer to household travelers, the total number of household travelers is indeed 2 2 N × (including both the adults and the children). The adult members in the households have to drop off their children at the school first and then go to the workplace. The desired arrival time at the workplace is time decisions, these household travelers will not only consider the travel cost of traveling to work, but also traveling to school.
Individual travelers
The individual travel cost (including the travel time cost and the schedule delay cost) by departing at time t is ( ) 
where ( ) 
where ( ) rt is the rate of traffic arriving at the bottleneck at time t .
Given the above standard setting in the literature, the departure rates from home (or arrival rates at the bottleneck) for commuters who arrive at the destination before and after desired arrival time * 2 t respectively are given by
For detailed derivation of Eq.(3), one may refer to Arnott et al. (1990) .
Household travelers
For household travelers, they have to drive their children to school before going to work. They will try to minimize the travel cost of the household as a whole, which is 
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The first part in Eq.(4) is the travel time cost and schedule delay cost for traveling to school (associated with the child in the household), while the second part is for work (associated with the adult in the household). Following the travel cost assumption for individual travelers, the travel cost in Eq.(4) assumes zero free-flow travel time between school and work, and also assumes zero additional travel delay caused by dropping-off children at school (both assumptions can be relaxed with the current framework by adding a constant delay, which is briefly discussed in Appendix A).
Also note that in Eq.(4), the value of time (VOT) and schedule delay penalties for school are considered identical to those for work. This simplification, as an initial step to understand dynamic traffic pattern under mixed travelers, makes the algebra in the paper much less tedious (but indeed still sufficiently complex). While in future study we will incorporate different VOTs and schedule delay penalties, the modeling framework and essential analysis here can still be applied in a similar way.
We focus on the situation where 
For those household early for school but late for work, the equilibrium departure rate (from home) is
For those household late for school and work, the equilibrium departure rate (from home) is
Derivation of the three rates given in Eq. (5) specific dynamic traffic pattern at the departure/arrival equilibrium given the numbers of individual travelers and households, and the work and school schedule difference (as shown in Section 3, there are four possible specific equilibrium traffic patterns).
3.! Commuting equilibrium with mixed travelers

Equilibrium traffic patterns
With the formulations in Section 2, we can derive the possible dynamic departure/arrival pattern at the user equilibrium. As shown in Figure 2 , four possible departure/arrival patterns can appear (later we refer to each pattern by ÒCaseÓ), depending on t are desired arrival times at school and at workplace respectively). The conditions for the occurrence of each pattern are summarized in Table 1 , and the critical time points in each pattern are summarized in Table 2 . Furthermore, three critical departure/arrival patterns (the boundary between two different traffic patterns) are also shown in Figure 2 . Note that in Figure 2 , the blue lines are departures from home, and the red lines are the arrivals at work (also the arrivals at school as we assume zero free-flow time between school and work place).
As one can see from the following discussion, household travelers are generally traveling earlier than individual travelers due to the school schedule. t , is relatively large, which means that the school schedule is much earlier than work schedule. Due to this early school schedule, all household travels are early for work (those arrive between 1 t and 2 t ). But they can be either early or late for school. Individual travelers will travel around their desired work arrival time
t (to reduce schedule delays), and can be either early or late for work (arrival occurs between 3 t and 4 t ). The departure and arrival of household and individual travels are completely separated, thus there is no direct flow interaction between the two classes of travelers.
Case 2 in Figure 2(b):
t D is less than that in Case 1, and the departure and arrival of household and individual travels are connected. ÒConnectedÓ means that the earliest individual travelers meet the latest household travelers at the highway bottleneck (both of them arrive at time 2 t ), and have to wait upon arrival at the bottleneck until the queue of household travelers disappears. All household travels are early for work (
tt < ), while might be early or late for school. Individual travelers can be either early or late for work (arrival occurs between 2 t and 3 t ).
The critical case between Case 1 and Case 2 is depicted in Figure 2 (e), where, the first individual traveler arrives at the bottleneck exactly when the last household travelers exit; there is no flow interaction at the highway bottleneck between the two classes of travelers.
Case 3 in Figure 2(c):
t D is relatively small, and the number of household 2 N is relatively large, thus some household travelers have to be late for work (they are also late for school).
All the arrivals earlier than * 2 t are household travels. However, some households are late for both school and work (arrive after t and 2 t (those arrive after 2 t are individual travelers). Indeed the departure and arrival of these household (late for both school and work) can be mixed with the individual travelers. In this ÒmixedÓ period, some individual travelers can be earlier than household travelers. However, even the departure order of these travelers can be different (any combination is possible as long as the departure rate is 21 rr ¢¢ ¢ = ), the traffic pattern will still be the same.
The critical case between Case 2 and Case 3 is depicted in Figure 2 (f), where the first individual traveler meets the last household traveler, and both of them are on time for work. There is no household travel which is late for school and work. 
Properties of the equilibrium traffic patterns
For given t D , Figure 3 displays the occurrence of each case (departure/arrival pattern) in the domain of ( )
,
NN . As can be seen, the domain of ( ) 12 , NN can be divided into four regions by the three lines (Line 1, Line 2 and Line 3), i.e., region (1), (2), (3) Table 1 . As mentioned, the model in Jia et al. (2016) corresponds to the y-axis ³× D × , Case 1 cannot arise, i.e., the departure/arrival of the two classes of travelers cannot be separated. Proposition 3-3 also indicates that increasing the number of individual travelers might force the household travelers to experience larger queuing delays (e.g., Case 1 ® Case 2 ® Case 4), and might force all the household travelers to be early for work (e.g., Case 3 ® Case 2), or to be early for school (Case 2 ® Case 4). Similar to Proposition 3-4, Proposition 3-5 can be obtained with Table 2 and Proposition 3-1. This result is expected as more travelers generally would indicate earlier peak start time. However, when the traffic pattern belongs to Case 1 (when the departure/arrival of household and individual travelers are completely separated), a marginal increase in individual travelers will not affect the peak start time (no direct interaction exists between households and individual travelers, and the peak start is fully determined by household travelers).
4.! User Cost and System Performance
In Section 3, we analyzed all the possible commuting traffic patterns in detail. Now we turn to the usersÕ travel cost and total travel cost.
UsersÕ travel cost
Based on Section 3 and with some manipulations, we can obtain the travel cost of individual travelers 1 c and travel cost of households 2 c , which are summarized in Proposition 4-1 indicates that when departure/arrival of two classes of travelers is close to each other (the arrivals are connected), increasing t D is beneficial. This is because, separating departure/arrival of two classes of travelers can reduce congestion, and the reduced congestion cost overweighs the schedule delay increase led by a larger t D (if any). The rational of Part (ii) of Proposition 4-1 is that when the arrivals of two classes of travelers are already fully disconnected, increasing t D will only increase the schedule delay cost of household travelers, as well as their travel cost. Furthermore, with Table 3 , we can find the first-order derivatives of 1 c and 2 c with respect to both 1 N and 2 N , which are summarized in Table 4 . As we can see, in most cases we have 
Proposition 4-2 indicates that the equilibrium travel cost of a user group tends to be more sensitive to the number of users in that group than the number in the other group. This result is similar to that in Lindsey (2004) even if the combined preferences of two members in a household bring further complexity (note that LindseyÕs paper only considers individual travelers). 
where 2 xNN = .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 4-3 indicates that, given the total number of users N and the schedule difference t D , increasing the proportion of households (i.e., increase of x , which means there will be less individual travelers) is beneficial to individual travelers (their travel costs decrease or at least do not increase) and is unfavorable to households (their travel costs increase or at least do not decrease). Furthermore, from Eq.(32), we know that within Case 3 and Case 4, where one class of travelers is dominating the population (Case 3: proportion of households is relatively large; Case 4: proportion of individual travelers is relatively large), the variation of the proportions of two classes of travelers will not change the travel costs (per household or per individual) of both households and individual travelers (however, total travel cost of all travelers will change).
Total cost and schedule coordination
Given the travel costs of individual travelers and households presented in Table 3 , we can easily obtain the total travel cost of all the users in all cases, i.e., 
Suppose the system authority is able to coordinate schedules of school and work, we have the following result. Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 4-4 provides the optimal schedule difference between school and work. This proposition implies that by appropriately coordinating the school and work schedules, the total travel cost can be reduced. Under the optimal schedule coordination given in Eq. (13) 
More specifically, increasing t D (traffic pattern belongs to Case 1), the queuing delay will not decrease while schedule delay cost of households will increase (due to a larger school and work schedule gap t D ). We further display how the total travel cost, schedule delay cost and queuing delay cost will vary with t D given the numbers of individual travelers and households in the following Figure 4 . Note that in some intervals in Case 3 and Case 4, the departure/arrival of households and individual travelers can be mixed, the queuing delay cost and schedule delay cost cannot be determined uniquely (the total travel cost is identical). 
<
As can be seen in Figure 4 , when t D increases, there is a trade-off between the total queuing delay cost and total schedule delay cost. The queuing delay cost is non-increasing over t D . This is expected as a larger t D further separates the departure/arrival of households and individual travelers, and traffic congestion is temporally relieved.
However, the schedule delay cost might not always increase with t D . For example, for Case 4 in Figure 4 (b), the schedule delay cost is decreasing. This is because, the number of individual travelers is relatively large and all households are forced to arrive earlier for school and work (one may refer to the traffic pattern in Figure 2(d) ). By increasing t D (suppose * 2 t is fixed, then it is equivalent to decreasing * 1 t ), without changing the traffic pattern, the households will have less earliness for school. Also, for Case 2 (in Figure 4(b) ), the schedule delay cost is decreasing with t D in the beginning. This is because, a larger t D will allow more individual travelers to arrive at the destination during the t D (between * 1 t and * 2 t ), and there will be less late arrival individual travelers (note that late arrival penalty is larger than the value of time and early arrival penalty). In Case 1, the schedule delay cost always increases with t D , simply because a larger work and school schedule gap leads to larger schedule delays (associated with work) for households.
Efficiency of schedule coordination
Following Proposition 4-4, the total travel cost of travelers under the optimal t D in Eq.(13) can be given as follows:
We consider 0 t D= as the benchmark case for efficiency analysis in which the total travel cost is 
Note that, in this benchmark case, as the work schedule coincides with the school schedule, all travelers have the same desired arrival time, and the commuting traffic pattern would be identical to that under standard bottleneck model (e.g., Arnott et al., 1990) , which is similar to that in Figure 2 
We then can define the percentage of cost reduction as 
With Eq. (14) and Eq.(15), after some manipulations, the relative efficiency defined in Eq. (16) can be rewritten as that in Eq. (17). From Eq. (17), it is straightforward to see that school and work schedule coordination have relatively small efficiency as
This is because, the travel cost reduction of schedule coordination comes from the separation between the departure/arrival of the two classes of travelers. As either 1 N or 2 N is relatively small, the impact of schedule coordination is limited by the small amount of traffic, i.e., { } 12 min , NN .
Proposition 4-5 also indicates that the relative efficiency of the schedule coordination can be determined in the way only related to the numbers of individual travelers and households.
Furthermore, as we can define
This means that the efficiency depends on the relative proportions of the two classes of travelers instead of the magnitude of the numbers of travelers. We further bound this efficiency as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 4-6. The percentage reduction in Eq. (17) satisfies
Note that
. It is easy to verify that when
Eq.(18) will reach the maximum value 642 -. We now further look at the system optimum where queueing is fully eliminated and schedule delay is minimized. This can be achieved by letting 0 t D= and implementing a first-best time-varying toll given as follows (joint scheme of schedule coordination and pricing). 
This cost can be regarded as the lower bound of the total travel cost of travelers. Similarly, the relative efficiency of the optimal joint scheme of schedule coordination and time-varying pricing can be defined as
The relative efficiency is further simplified in Eq.(23). 
It is obvious that SO q is greater than 50%. However, 50% SO q® if either 1 N or 2 N approaches zero. Suppose 2 0 N ® , the situation approaches the case with identical individual travelers, and the first-best pricing described in Figure 5 would lead to 50% SO q= , which is well noticed in the literature. Moreover, the departure/arrival order of the travelers will make no difference as they are identical. However, when 2 0 N > , an appropriate departure/arrival order of the two classes of travelers (the one described in Figure 5 ) is needed to minimize the schedule delay cost. This additional gain arising from appropriate departure/arrival order results in an efficiency larger than 50%.
Similarly, the efficiency in Eq. (23) Without pricing, while we can reduce traffic congestion and travel cost by coordination of work and school schedules, we lose certain level of efficiency. We define the loss of efficiency as follows: In summary, schedule coordination can help reduce travel cost (against benchmark case) by up to 34.31%, while the joint scheme of coordination and pricing can reduce total cost by at least 50% and at most 58.58%. Schedule coordination loses efficiency compared with the joint scheme. However, this efficiency loss can be upper bounded.
5.! Numerical Analysis
In this section, numerical experiments are conducted to verify and illustrate the essential ideas in the paper. Following Liu et al. (2015b) , we take the value of time, schedule delay penalties as follows:
The highway bottleneck capacity is 30(veh/min) s = .
Cost contours in the domain of ( )
, NN
Given t D (here we use 30 minutes), Figure 6 displays the total travel cost contours, individual travel cost contours, and the household travel cost contours in the domain of ( )
,
NN . In Figure 6 , the red solid line represents Line 1 in Figure 3 , and the red dashed line represents Line 2 in Figure 3 , and the red dash-dotted line represent Line 3 in Figure 3 . These three lines divide the domain of ( ) 12 , NN into four regions, which correspond to Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4 (as shown in Figure 3 ).
As can be seen in Figure 6 (a), the total travel cost increases with 1 N and 2 N . This is because, a larger number of travelers indicates a larger travel cost for either household or individual traveler (one can verify from Figure 6 (b) and Figure 6(c) ). This total travel cost increase is nonlinear as the contours become denser when 1 N or 2 N is larger (for Figure 6(a) ). We also notice that the individual travel cost in Figure 6 (b) and the household travel cost in Figure 6 (c) linearly increase (or at least do not decrease) with 1 N or 2 N in each region (there are four regions in total, therefore, household travel cost and individual travel cost are both piece-wise linear over 1 N and 2 N ). These results are consistent with those in Table 4 . Figure 6 . Costs Contours in the domain of ( )
, NN
Total cost, schedule delay cost, and queuing delay cost
Given the travel demand in each user class, Figure 7 and Figure 8 show how total travel cost, total travel delay cost, total schedule delay cost, as well as these total costs for individual travelers or households, vary with t D . Figure we further see that total schedule delay cost of individual travelers decreases or at least does not increase with t D . This is because, as t D becomes larger, the impact of households on individual travelers is lessening (i.e., less individual travelers are pushed to arrive late, the critical case (Case 1) is that t D becomes large enough, departure/arrival of the two classes of travelers are completely separated), thus individual travelers have smaller schedule delay costs. Also we notice that the queueing delay costs for households and individual travelers are both non-increasing with t D , which means both of them benefit from the schedule coordination in terms of travel delays. In all three situations in Figure 9 , individual travel cost always decreases or at least does not increase with x , and household travel cost increases or at least does not decrease over x , which are also stated in Proposition 4-3. However, we notice that the average cost (as well as the total travel cost, since N is constant in each situation) might decrease with x . This is somehow counterintuitive as we might expect that household travel cost is larger than individual travel cost (there are two persons in a household, household travel cost is Òdouble costÓ), and a larger x means that there are more in the total demand N with Òdouble costÓ. 
6.! Conclusions
In this study, we examined how the rush-hour traffic pattern with household and individual travels differs from that generated by the conventional standard bottleneck model, and how it changes with the proportions of the two classes of commuters, and the time difference between school schedule and work schedule. This paper incorporates the model in Jia et al. (2016) as a special or extreme case, where the number of individual commuters is equal to zero.
Besides modeling and analyzing the possible dynamic traffic patterns at the departure/arrival equilibrium with mixed travelers, we propose to coordinate the work and school schedules to temporally relieve traffic congestion and thus reduce the total travel cost of travelers.
Efficiency of such schedule coordination has been evaluated and bounded. Moreover, we found that total travel cost can decrease with the proportion of household travelers in the population. In addition, our numerical experiment suggests that the schedule delay cost does not always increase with the difference between two desired arrival times (for work and school).
As mentioned in the paper, the value of time and schedule delay penalties for school (usually this is associated with the child in the household) is considered to be identical to those for work (usually this is associated with the adult in the household). This assumption or simplification makes the algebra in the paper much less tedious (while still quite complex). However, the main idea and modeling framework in the paper would be still valid even if we consider different VOTs and schedule penalties for school and for work. Our future study will consider that all travelers (both households and individual travelers) are heterogeneous in their VOTs and schedule penalties. Kuwahara (1990) is one of the leading researches to examine the dynamic traffic equilibrium under two tandem bottlenecks. The network in this paper (as shown in Figure 1 ) would be similar to Kuwahara (1990) if a bottleneck between school and workplace is added. Our future work will try to consider such a network with a bottleneck between home and school, and with a bottleneck between school and work. Under this network setting, we will try to incorporate three different types of trips: individual work trip, household trip, and school trip (only goes to school but not work). It is worth mentioning that, our work here focuses more on how household travel (departure time choices are governed by both work and school schedules) is different from individual travel, and how interactions between household travel and individual travel re-shapes the morning commute, while we ignore the network topologyÕs (e.g., two tandem bottlenecks) impact.
postpone the arrival of the adult in the household at work, thus he or she might be late for work even if an individual traveler departing from home at the same time can be early for work. These two cases will never occur in the original situation where the delay due to school is not considered. Even though it can still be shown that appropriate schedule coordination can reduce travel cost by separating departure/arrival of households and individual travelers.
Also note that if 0 sd t ® , Case (e) and Case (f) in Figure 10 approaches Case (a) and Case (b).
Figure 10. Possible commuting patterns when free-flow times and delay due to school are non-zero We can further translate the conditions in Table 5 into the domain of ( ) 12 , NN in Figure 11 , which is similar to Figure 3 (we omit the details). One can also see from Figure 11 that once 0 sd t ® , Case (e) and Case (f) will disappear. In practice, we can expect that sd t is relatively small when compared to the whole journey time for the morning trips. 
